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Abstract Within biology and in society, living crea-
tures have long been described using metaphors of
machinery and computation: ‘bioengineering’, ‘genes
as code’ or ‘biological chassis’. This paper builds on
Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) argument that such lan-
guage mechanisms shape how we understand the world.
I argue that the living machines metaphor builds upon a
certain perception of life entailing an idea of radical
human control of the living world, looking back at the
historical preconditions for this metaphor. I discuss how
design is perceived to enable us to shape natural beings
to our will, and consider ethical, epistemological and
ontological implications of the prevalence of this meta-
phor, focusing on its use within synthetic biology. I
argue that we urgently need counter-images to the dom-
inant metaphor of living machines and its implied con-
trol and propose that artworks can provide such counter-
images through upsetting the perception of life as con-
trollable. This is argued through discussion of artworks
by Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, by Tarsh Bates and by Ai
Hasegawa, which in different ways challenge mechanis-
tic assumptions through open-ended engagement with
the strangeness and messiness of life.
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Introduction
Metaphors of machinery and computation abound within
biology, from ‘genes as code’ or ‘biological chassis’ to
‘microbial cell factory’. These metaphors are especially
prevalent in mainstream media science communication
and in science education. This paper takes as a starting
point Lakoff and Johnson’s argument in Metaphors We
Live By [1] that such language mechanisms shape how we
understand the world. While the ‘living machines’ meta-
phor is increasingly prevalent in recent years with the
influx of bioinformatics and emergence of new bioengi-
neering fields such as synthetic biology, its history can be
traced beyond the Mechanical Philosophy of the Scientific
Revolution, to the mechanistic thoughts of the pre-Socratic
Greeks.
In this paper, I will, after discussing the conceptual-
isation of metaphors, start by addressing aspects of
mechanistic philosophy1 that form an important
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11569-019-00355-2
1 Several philosophers have pointed to the multiple meanings of the
term ‘mechanism’ in biology and attempted to distinguish these [2–4].
I will here follow Nicholson’s [3] distinction between three meanings:
(a) mechanistic philosophy, which he calls mechanicism, (b) machine
mechanism, the inner workings of any machine-like structure, which
are today mostly referred to simply as ‘machines’, and (c) causal
mechanism, a mode of explanation of a relevant causal process within
an organism (as in ‘the mechanism of heredity’). While the latter is the
most common use of ‘mechanism’ in contemporary biology, and has
been the subject of extensive philosophical enquiry in the past two
decades (e.g. [4, 5]), these meanings do tend to get conflated in both
scientific and philosophical discussions.
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historical backdrop for the current use of machine met-
aphors. I argue that the living machines metaphor con-
tributes to an idea of radical human control of the living
world and that the success of synthetic biology in
spreading visions of how its engineering approach will
change life as we know it means that the machine
metaphor becomes further ingrained in societal percep-
tions of living organisms. I discuss how design in syn-
thetic biology is perceived to enable us to shape natural
beings to our will, and briefly consider ethical, episte-
mological and ontological implications of the preva-
lence of this. I argue that other metaphors do not cur-
rently serve to properly balance the living machines
metaphor, and we urgently need to search for such
balance in the face of the dominant metaphor. Therefore,
I look to artworks that set out to challenge the notion of
life as machinery for quite other, equally spectacular
visions.2 The evocative, embodied presence of art can,
I argue, serve as a counterbalance to the predominance
of a metaphor that frames life in a rather reductive and
inaccurate manner. I discuss three artworks that are
themselves concerned in various ways with control,
but that problematize the extent to which we can control
and understand living organisms. Drawing on artworks
in the discussion of synthetic biology is particularly
appropriate, since a subsection of this field, whose ef-
forts to engineer biology is focused on creativity, play,
and the spectacular, explicitly values aesthetics and the
creative input of artists and designers [6, 7].
Metaphors We Live By
Lakoff and Johnson, in Metaphors We Live By, argue
that metaphor ‘is not just a matter of language, that is, of
mere words […] human thought processes are largely
metaphorical’ ([1]: p. 6). They hold that we form sys-
tematic ways of talking about a certain overarching
concept, informed by the metaphorical concept itself.
For instance, they use the metaphor ‘argument is war’
and show how it is used to describe how we argue: we
‘win’, and ‘lose’ arguments, ‘shoot down’ the ‘oppo-
nent’, ‘attack’ or ‘defend a position’ and so on ([1]: pp.
5–6). These ways of speaking become so much a part of
our everyday speech and thought patterns that we hardly
think of them as metaphors at all. But Lakoff and
Johnson ask us to imagine a culture where argument,
instead, was perceived as a dance. This is a potent
description of the power of metaphors, in language,
images and so on, to shape how we think about the
world. In making us focus on certain aspects of a con-
cept, other aspects may be kept out of focus.
This cognitive linguistic view challenged what was up
until the 1980s the predominant idea of metaphors, as a
component of language distinct from the literal, withmain-
ly aesthetic or diversionary purposes [8, 9]. Lakoff and
Johnson’s lucid argument has led to new realisations about
how metaphorical language shapes the way we think. A
number of scholars have showed how this applies to
science, also from insider’s perspectives [10–12]. As Laura
Otis argues about the connections nineteenth century sci-
entists made between nerves and networks of telegraph
lines, such analogies have real conceptual force: ‘meta-
phors do not ‘express’ scientists’ ideas; they are the ideas’
([13]: p. 48). In the context of synthetic biology, McLeod
and Nerlich ([14]: p. 2) posit that ‘the language we use to
make a better world matters; words matter; metaphors
matter’.
The metaphor of life as machinery is widespread, and
for good reasons. It is hard to imagine how a cell
operates, since it functions at such a different scale from
our own. Imbuing it with a metaphor enhances particu-
lar understandings, which can be quite helpful. Nichol-
son [9] has distinguished between three major roles for
scientific metaphors: (1) theoretical, which is important
to scientific understanding, (2) heuristic, which can be
key to scientific discovery and (3) rhetorical, which is
central to scientific communication. He emphasises that
for the most pervasive metaphors, all three roles can be
in play. This is certainly the case for the machine con-
ception of life. As a ‘grand metaphor’ [8], it inspires a
whole range of sub-metaphors, some of which will be
discussed later in the paper.
Universal Mechanism
The idea that the universe is comparable to a large
mechanism, which runs rationally and predictably like
a machine, has existed since the ancients. The
Babylonians were able to predict celestial occurrences,
and the Greeks inherited from them the idea that heav-
enly motions were regular and could be rationally
2 Definitions of ‘life’ have been contested at least since the time of
Aristotle, and there is still not one, clear distinction between life and
non-life. Discussing these definitions is beyond the scope of the present
paper, but it is important to note that referring to ‘life’ generically is
itself a somewhat reductive approach and is done heuristically.
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understood through mathematics and geometrical
models. Many philosophies of the time drew on these
perspectives in seeking to understand the natural world,
most prominently atomist theories deriving from
Democritus’s materialist philosophy and developed by
Epicurus, and most of Stoic physics.
While traditionally, it has been assumed that materi-
alist, mechanistic theories in astronomy and biology
took their cue from developments of technology and
increased understandings of machinery, de Solla Price
[15] argued that it was the other way around: mechanis-
tic philosophy led to the making of increasingly ad-
vanced automata, which brought about much of the
technology we now take for granted. He supported this
by discussion of the development of mechanisms to
study the cosmos from the time of the Greeks. Rational,
mechanistic explanations of the universe as a mecha-
nism led to a focus on societal development quite dif-
ferent from that required by vitalism and theology.
There is little doubt, however, that by the time of the
Scientific Revolution, technology and mechanistic
thought developed in tandem. Building on religious tra-
ditions from the Scholastics, humans were seen as unique
in the cosmos in exhibiting proof of souls. Thomas
Aquinas’ Summa Theologica (written 1265–1274) held
forth that animals show orderly behaviour and this has
often been taken as cause for viewing them as biological
machines. This view was famously expressed by Des-
cartes [16],3 who drew a clear line between humanminds
and the rest of the biological world, on which he did have
a mechanist view. His prioritising of what can be known
through the rational mind over what could be experi-
enced broke with the established Aristotelian adage
that ‘there is nothing in the mind that was not first in
the senses’. Although it was disputed by some of his
contemporaries, including Spinoza, the dualist separation
between the thinking substance and the substance of
extension in space would be core to major strands of
philosophy and science after Descartes [17].
Mechanistic thought at his time came into prominence,
although it was far from unitary, as can be seen in the
atomist theory of Francis Bacon and the materialist, possi-
bly atheist approach of Thomas Hobbes. Their view ap-
pears to have gone well beyond metaphor to an ontic
perception of the bête machine, as a creature that was, in
every way that mattered for analysis, a machine. There is
little doubt that this way of thinking furthered scientific
discovery. Using analogies of familiar items is a way of
bringing closer realms that we cannot access directly, such
as the inside of the human body and, later, the radically
different scales of the nano realm [2].
A central tenet of the mechanistic worldview of the
Scientific Revolution was the notion of an intelligent
designer [3, 4]. For Descartes, as for the next genera-
tions of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scholars,
the laws of nature were established by God. The clock-
work universe theory, inspired by the Newtonian laws of
motion, was popular amongst deists who saw the world
as a mechanical clock wound up by the Creator. How-
ever, the close linkage between mechanistic philosophy
and the idea of intelligent design was criticised byHume
[18]. He let Philo, the voice of his ideas, point out that
our experience with design is limited to human prac-
tices, and that we should not presume on such spurious
grounds that we have a model for the workings of the
entire universe. To prove his point, Philo speculated that
both an animal and a plant, in their ability to self-
maintain and regenerate, might be closer analogies for
the universe than the existing machine analogy [18].
With Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural
selection, presented in The Origin of Species in 1859, a
naturalistic alternative to the intelligent design account
became plausible. After this period, the idea of nature as
a machine no longer necessarily includes the meaning
‘designed by an intelligence’ ([4]: p. 289). Strikingly,
this did not result in mechanistic language being
stripped of its ontic significance. Rather, it seems evo-
lutionary biology adapted to mechanistic thought, so the
idea of ‘designed machines’ became the notion of
‘evolved machines’ [3, 19]. However, the conception
of design still exists within creationism and other reli-
gious movements [19], and within ethics is important in
the natural law argument that human beings ‘play God’
when they manipulate nature [20].
Throughout the centuries described above, mechanistic
thought waged for dominance with vitalism in perceptions
of living things. Vitalist conceptions of life were anti-
reductionist, but also dualistically distinguished life from
mere matter, following Aristotle’s division between form
and matter [21, 22]. In vitalist thought from the eighteenth
century onwards, this dualism became less marked, but the
idea remained that living things contain a vital force.
Vitalism played an important role in critiquing mechanism
for its tendency towards reductionism and generalisation to
(too) few scientific laws. Mechanism, concurrently,
3 Descartes’ mechanistic and dualistic ideas were further developed in
the 1648 book L’Homme.
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challenged the tendency in vitalism towards absolute dis-
tinction between the living and the non-living, increasingly
supported by findings that living things were made from
the same substances as non-living objects, and that the
principle of conservation of energy was equally applicable
to both [21]. After those challenges, vitalism regrouped to
stress organisational and structural differences between life
and the non-living, focused on the complexity and irreduc-
ibility of living beings. This position became known as
holism, and continued to be a counterpoint to mechanism
in polemical discussions [2, 21].
In the early twentieth century, mechanistic thinking in
biology surged, spurred, amongst other things, by a
desire to make biology into a ‘hard science’ following
the model of physics and chemistry. Jacques Loeb’s
influential The Mechanistic Conception of Life, pub-
lished in 1912, argued vigorously that everything in life
resulted from physicochemical processes. This was the
same year as Stéphane Leduc published his book La
Biologie Synthétique (possibly the first use of the term
synthetic biology), which presented similar arguments to
Loeb’s about a continuum between life and non-life, but
without the engineering drive for control [23, 24]. At the
same time, vitalist ideas resurged, importantly through
works of Bergson and biologist philosophers Uexküll
and Driesch [2, 22]. However, holistic approaches, even
those that shared mechanism’s materialist epistemology,
were increasingly ignored and disdained by practicing
scientists, on partly political grounds due to their similar-
ities to Nazi ‘organicism’ and Marxist dialectical materi-
alism [2, 25]. Jacob and Monod’s work on genetic cir-
cuits in the 1960s refined the engineering approach de-
veloped by Loeb and his contemporaries, and introduced
the analogy between genes and computer programs with
their ‘genetic program’. In describing themselves as be-
ing the first to truly aim for engineering biology, today’s
synthetic biology practitioners are curiously similar to
their twentieth century predecessors [26].
The machine metaphor in biology, then, has a long
prehistory. It also coexists with other metaphors, which
both contend and conspire to make up the overall ideas
within biology. The two other grand metaphors within
biology are the language/book metaphor and the organic
system metaphor [8, 14].4 Gilbert & Sarkar [25] viewed
language as ‘an excellent analogy’ for organicist, materi-
alist holism: ‘The meaning of the sentence is obviously
determined by the meaning of the words; but the meaning
of each word is determined by context of the sentence it is
in’ ([25]: p. 2). This illustrates organicists’ emphasis on the
emergent properties arising through the interaction of bio-
logical parts.
Although Konopka mentioned a high likelihood of
overlap between the three grand metaphors, neither he
nor Gilbert and Sarkar emphasised the degree to which
information technologies have in recent years subsumed
the language metaphor to the machine conception.
Terms such as ‘information’, ‘editing’ and ‘code’ now
bring up the image of computer software. For bioengi-
neering, the information metaphor entails a distinction
between ‘software’ and ‘hardware’, bringing back a
version of Cartesian dualism in distinguishing between
the information contained in the genome and the cell
itself [9]. Information technology has radically trans-
formed biology and brought about new fields such as
synthetic and systems biology. Computers potentially
enable greater understanding of complexity, through
their ability to process huge amounts of information,
which has led to the development of various ‘omics’
technologies. This can also be considered a holistic view
of the organism, without the ‘fuzzy’ connotations of
vitalism [25]. Microbiome research and epigenetics
have both increasingly sought to understand the com-
plex interactions that define any organic system [14].
These approaches now co-exist with bioengineering
approaches such as synthetic biology, where the view
of living machines is fore-fronted. This situation serves
to make us think, again, about the meaning of life and
our situations as humanswithin a complex environment.
Biological Machines in Synthetic Biology
Synthetic biology, as a field, is defined as ‘the engineer-
ing of biology: the synthesis of complex, biologically
based (or inspired) systems, which display functions
that do not exist in nature’ [27]. Synthetic biology
(hereafter synbio) involves bioengineering at different
scales, with two main approaches: (a) bottom-up, con-
structing organisms ‘from scratch’, or (b) top-down,
reducing the complexity of existing organisms to levels
that are workable and understandable [28]. Beyond this
broad distinction, synbio encompasses multiple research
programs, from synthetic genomics and protocell
4 While McLeod & Nerlich [14] replace the organic system metaphor
with the computer metaphor, I argue that this can be viewed as part of
the machine master metaphor and that it is important to keep in mind
that the idea of the ‘organism’ is also a heuristic.
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research to ‘unnatural molecular biology’, which seeks
to create entirely new molecular biologies, from differ-
ent amino acids than those existing in nature to chiral
molecular structures (mirror-image life forms, imagined
to be applicable even to human beings) [6, 19]. In recent
years, advances within genetic sequencing and genome
editing [29, 30] make engineering of mammalian organ-
isms more feasible. While traditional genetic engineer-
ing is often described as ‘cut-and-pasting’ genes [14],
synbio aims to go beyond this. Since the mid-2000s,
synthetic biologists have defined their work in opposi-
tion to genetic engineering, as seeking to ‘create’
completely new biological systems or organisms [31,
32]. The aims of these projects vary widely, from bio-
remediation to synthesis of valuable substances such as
drugs, chemicals or biofuels.
The epistemological assumption remains the same,
however. As Keller [24] has argued, the ‘synthesis’
(putting something back together) of synthetic biology
does not have the same relationship to ‘analysis’ (pick-
ing something apart in order to understand it) as previ-
ous modes of science. In synbio, synthesis does not
necessarily come after analysis. Indeed, ‘[k]nowledge
as making might be said to be the first credo of synthetic
biology’ ([24]: p. 293). This idea thatmaking is knowing
and building is understanding is integral to what is
frequently called ‘the engineering mindset’ [30]. The
novelty of the synbio engineering mindset is often
emphasised both by practitioners and social scientists
[31, 33], although, as the previous section has shown,
there is a certain continuity to this approach.
While the actual work that goes on in synbio labora-
tories varies widely, an idealised engineering vision has
become important to the field’s identity (34, 30]. This
entails that engineering means standardisation of com-
ponents, decoupling of a project into smaller parts that
can then be assembled, and reduction of the messy
complexity of life to a level at which it can be controlled
and useful [31]. Viewing living organisms as intricate
machines, synthetic biologists seek to understand and
adapt them by taking them apart, isolating their func-
tional components, and using that partial understanding
to remove what is not needed, insert synthetic DNA, and
thus design a new, useful entity [19].
While biology after Darwin related to the idea of
evolved machines rather than designed machines, in
synbio, the idea of ‘design’ resurfaces at full strength –
but now it is design at the hands of humans, rather than
God. Boldt ([34]: p. 2) suggests that this might be
because ‘if one succeeded in explaining organisms or
parts of organisms as if they were designed to fulfill a
specific purpose, this is to say that one succeeded in
identifying causal relations in organisms that allows for
their purposeful redesign and reengineering.’ Rational
design of predictable, reliable systems, a biological Tay-
lorism, is the ultimate goal. This is repeatedly
emphasised in synbio through the abundance of terms
such as ‘genetically engineered machines’ [35], ‘genetic
circuits’ [29] and ‘multipart assembly’ [36]. Most of
these terms are inherited from genetics and molecular
biology, including the idea of the genome as a ‘blue-
print’ of the organism, containing all the information
necessary to develop the final product [14, 22].
The approach to engineering presented by synthetic
biologists has, as has been pointed out repeatedly [26,
37] been rather reductive. Engineering is elsewhere
described as a social, economic and practical endeavour
as well as a scientific one, and even as ‘the use of
heuristics and available resources to accomplish desired
changes in situations that are poorly understood’ (Koen
2003: p. 28, discussed in [37]: p. 652). However, influ-
ential synthetic biologists have defined it more narrow-
ly. Calvert ([26]: p. 410) quotes Tom Knight describing
the engineer’s attitude to complexity: ‘a biologist is
delighted with complexity. The engineer’s response is:
“How can I get rid of this?”’Even though other fractions
of the field relate less to this ideal, it has become core to
the identity of synbio [38]. The ideal remains strong
even as there is increasing acknowledgement that the
idealised computer-based design plan followed by exe-
cution in the organism is far from the reality. What is
actually done at present is more often closer to ‘tinker-
ing’ [26], involving iterative processes of explorative
experimentation and extensive troubleshooting [39].
The international Genetically Engineered Machine
competition (iGEM) in synbio, started in 2004, involves
students in using and developing standardised biological
parts, called BioBricks™ (see e.g. [40]), to design mi-
croorganisms with novel properties. These parts are then
added to the Registry of Standardised Biological Parts
and ‘can be mixed and matched to build synthetic biol-
ogy devices and systems’ [35]. The competition has
been very successful as an educational venture, growing
year by year, and including 344 multidisciplinary teams
from all over the world in 2018 [35]. The competition is
recognised as an important factor in the development of
the engineering identity of the field, and has given cause
to a large amount of publicity [33]. Another effect of this
Nanoethics (2020) 14:57–70 61
competition has been to imbue synbio with a sense of
‘fun’ and ‘coolness’ [26], and the idea that it is indeed
easy to create new life using modular systems. Yet, very
few standardised parts are actually reused. This seems to
reflect a low trust in the standards, which is no wonder,
given that the requirements for accepting a new
BioBrick into the registry are not very rigid [41]. The
ideal of modularity, we see, is more ideal than reality at
this point, and the comparison of the genetic parts to
simple, rectangular Lego blocks that can be added onto
each other in predictable ways is misleading.
Modular systems are an important aim for several
reasons, but interesting to mention is the open source
ideology that is often cited [26]. Synbio is through its
focus on standardisation, ‘deskilling’ and open source
one of the more accessible fields of science and has been
important in opening up biology to do-it-yourself (DIY)
practices. DIY biology (DIYbio) is a non-institutional
phenomenon of citizens working with biology, some-
times with a ‘hacker’ mentality [26, 42]. Indeed, also
within the institutional synbio communities it is not
uncommon to refer to one’s work as ‘hacking life’,
which may, like tinkering, be a more appropriate analo-
gy than rational design [26].
It is important to state that most scientists today do not,
contrary to some of their mechanist predecessors, assume
that the living organisms they work with are exactly like
machines (see e.g. [43, 44]). Implicitly or explicitly, this
metaphor is used heuristically. However, especially in
communicating knowledge to general audiences and stu-
dents, the heuristic nature of the metaphor tends to get lost
[9, 22, 45]. This is particularly so in the more spectacular
synbio approaches, which make far-reaching claims about
the creation of novel living organisms.
Media coverage of synbio in the Western context [33]
was generally driven by breakthrough events such as the J.
Craig Venter Institute’s artificial version of the Mycoplas-
ma mycoides genome, presented as the world’s first self-
replicating, synthetic bacterial cell [46],5 and by key prac-
titioners’ visions of future applications, such as George
Church’s comments from 2012 onwards on the potential
to reengineer Neanderthals and woolly mammoths [6].
Overall, a handful of synbio practitioners have been able
to steer public perceptions more than their genetic
engineering colleagues, successfully constructing more
positive public perceptions of synbio [33, 49]. What gives
cause for concern is that these are largely the researchers
that embrace the spectacular science vision, and commu-
nicate the machine metaphor with few reservations. These
grand visions communicate absolute faith in human ability
to eventually control our environment completely, leading
to the eradication of diseases, enhancement of positive
qualities and fulfilment of all our desires. As is the case
with the new genome editing techniques, synbio commu-
nications to the public have over-emphasised the amount
of control and standardisation that is currently possible, in
their eagerness to show the validity of the machine meta-
phor [14].
Ontological, Epistemological and Ethical
Implications of the Machine Metaphor
Visual studies scholar W.J.T. Mitchell asked in 2002:
‘What does it mean when the paradigmatic object on the
assembly line is no longer a mechanism but an
engineered organism?’ ([50]: p. 487). Mitchell pointed
out, referring to Walter Benjamin’s work on technolog-
ical reproduction, that in what he termed the age of
biocybernetics, ‘reproduction’ is no longer about mass
production of objects or images, but about biological
reproductive processes. One of the important distinc-
tions between these two is that we cannot expect exact
copies of biological machines. Life will evolve, mutate,
behave in unexpected ways, and is not as easily fixed as
computer code [9, 19, 34, 41].
Nicholson [9] has argued that organisms are distinct
frommachines in that the latter are extrinsically purposive,
and the former intrinsically so. The intrinsic purposiveness
of organisms ‘is grounded on the fact that they are self-
organising, self-producing, self-maintaining, and self-
regenerating’ ([9]: p. 163), with an aim towards maintain-
ing and propagating themselves. In machines, the above
processes are externally organised, for a range of purposes
determined by external agents. This boundary is partially
blurred through bioengineering approaches such as synbio,
as human agents seek to determine the purposes of organ-
isms-as-machines. Another key distinction, however, is
maintained: in a machine the parts are created before,
and often independent of, thewhole they constitute, where-
as in an organism parts exist in a state of collective inter-
dependence. If I know the function of individual machine
parts, I can reliably predict the overall behaviour of the
5 Craig Venter described the cell ‘Synthia’ flippantly in a news story as
‘the first species to have its parent be a computer’ [47]. Although
acknowledged as a breakthrough event, many experts agreed that it
did ‘not amount to creating life as either a scientific or a moral matter’
[48].
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machine [9, 34]. The ontological assumption that the same
goes for a living organism leads to synbio’s focus on
biological parts, minimal genomes and cells, and other
metaphors of machine components that can be used in
the design of simple organisms. As has been increasingly
argued over the past few years, this approach has had
limited success, and can be a barrier to further discoveries
within the field [22, 30, 32, 41].
There is disagreement amongst scholars as to wheth-
er synbio represents anything qualitatively new. Preston
[37] argues that it is only the latest in a line of develop-
ment that has lasted as long as humans have practiced
agriculture, and that biotechnology crossed the ontolog-
ical line of seeking to control and manipulate plants and
animals in the Neolithic. This is a variant of the argu-
ment that synbio is simply at one range of a spectrum
stretching from ‘natural’ to ‘designed’ organisms [28,
40]. Others argue that despite this continuity, the pur-
poseful design and rearranging of biological parts
crosses a threshold into novel territory, from ‘manipula-
tion’ to ‘creation’ [34]. Whether or not one agrees that
the goal of constructing organisms from scratch is qual-
itatively different from manipulating existing ones (and
whether or not one buys into synbio’s claims that this
will ultimately be achieved), the explicit aim of con-
structing ‘living machines’ clearly constitutes an exac-
erbation of existing attitudes towards living organisms
as materials that can, and should, be manipulated at will.
The drive towards standardisation and the wide-
spread use of machine metaphors may be more indica-
tive of ‘an underlying awareness of human limitations’
than of a questionable desire to conquer nature [28; see
also 39]. The very awareness of daunting biological
complexity may precipitate the drive for predictable,
standardised biological systems for making useful prod-
ucts. However, the repeated statements that the rest of
biology needs to adopt the engineering mindset [30]
seem to indicate a sense that this is the right approach
to studying biology. This reaches beyond methodology
into the realms of epistemology and ontology. Way et al.
([30]: p. 151) argued that synbio ‘made an impact on the
thinking about biological systems, redefining organisms
such as microbes previously appreciated for their basic
biology or pathogenic properties, in terms of their value
for biological redesign’. This drive towards spreading
the ontology of organisms-as-machines is worrisome.
The machine metaphor is highly helpful in synbio for
analysing parts and their function within the whole, and
in some cases for understanding how to create novel,
useful organisms based on known principles. However,
it also leads to systematic under-appreciation of qualities
of organisms that do not fit the language of this master
metaphor, such as evolutionary development and ecosys-
tem interactions. This may result in underestimating the
side effects of synthetically created organisms in an en-
vironment [34], over-confidence in technological fixes,
and missed opportunities for scientific understanding [10,
22]. Therefore, the persistent use of these metaphors can
be considered an ethical issue that needs to be dealt with
responsibly [14].
So, while we can productively use the metaphor of
life as machinery, we need to maintain a critical aware-
ness of what this means. As Lakoff and Johnson [1]
argued, one of the ways this can be achieved is through
counter-narratives and other metaphors. For instance, an
alternative to the ‘genome as blueprint’ sub-metaphor is
the ‘genome as recipe’ metaphor, which takes into ac-
count phenomena such as pleiotropy (historically in-
duced redundancy) and epistasis (interactions between
genes) [22]. While the recipe metaphor can also be
misleading, potentially conveying an idea of a step-by-
step manual for making an organism, a plurality of
metaphors can serve to counterbalance the predomi-
nance of one conception. This may lead to a less skewed
perception of how a particular organism might function,
not just on its own, but in its environment.
However, the recipe metaphor only speaks to one
sub-metaphor of the machine conception, and cannot
serve as a grand metaphor of the same order. Embracing
the organic system metaphor [8] more fully can be one
alternative, and indeed, systemic thinking has long been
one of the recommendations from philosophers. Sys-
tems biology, another recent computer-based approach
to biology that takes a more holistic path of looking at
connections within large-scale systems, still represents
the engineering mindset, and the two fields have multi-
ple synergies [32]. So far, systems biology has been less
adept than synthetic biology in reaching larger publics.
More of a real contrast is found in developmental and
field biology (e.g. [51]). For public perception, however,
important avenues of influence can be found in the
realms of art and design. Paul Freemont, synthetic biol-
ogist and co-curator of synbio exhibition Grow Your
Own… Life After Nature, stated in a video on the Sci-
ence Gallery Dublin [52]: ‘The greatest fear is that
society doesn’t accept the technology, and that every-
thing around synthetic biology stops’. Using artists in
shaping those perceptions is a conscious decision [52].
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Embracing the Messy: Artists Counter
the Standardisation of Synthetic Biology
Synbio, as argued by artist Oron Catts, ‘is one of the first
technologies in which there is a very direct move to
engineer public acceptance even before the technology is
here. I have been to some meetings where it was said that
we have to learn from genetic engineering; we have to
create public acceptance before we push it. And the solu-
tion was to use artists’ ([53]: p. 79). However, he contin-
ued, ‘there is a community of artists who are sophisticated
enough and have the experience to try tomanipulate this. It
might not work, but we need to address such issues and I
think these areas need cultural scrutiny’ [53]. Aiming at a
rather different audience than that of popular science, art is
situated to convey the issues of science and the living
world from and to the perspective of human beings, but
without a necessarily human-centric approach. Like sci-
ence, art is concerned with creation and control, but often
at a different level and for different ends. It also contains
centrally elements of playfulness, encouraging imagination
and wonder [54–56], which according to Nussbaum ([54]:
p. 100) have an ‘important role in shaping democratic
citizenship’.
There are plenty of examples of artists embracing the
project of synbio, both using the same methods and
subscribing to the corresponding metaphors. An exam-
ple of an evocative piece that follows this path is Joe
Davis’ collaborative work with George Church’s lab to
record the written information on Wikipedia in DNA.
The aim of the project Malus ecclesia (bad church, or
apple church) is to create a ‘tree of knowledge’,
inserting the synthetic ‘raw DNA’ into saplings of the
oldest known apple species, malus sieversii (see e.g.
[57]). This rich project very much embraces not just
the methods, but also the metaphors and mindset, of
synbio. However, other artists take the path suggested
by Catts in the previous paragraph, including himself, in
his projects with partner Ionat Zurr.
Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr
Catts and Zurr are lead artists at SymbioticA, University
of Western Australia, the world’s only Centre for Excel-
lence in Biological Arts. They have made a career of
more than 20 years of using biological techniques in
artworks that question narratives of ‘life as a coded
program—“biology as information”’ ([58]: p. 126). Pro-
lific writers, they state their desire ‘to argue for the
ethical, cultural, and political importance of experiential
engagement with life manipulation, as it can be an
effective methodology to confront the complexities
and to contest dominant ideologies regarding the life
sciences’ [58]. They explicitly seek to counter
genocentrism and ‘genohype’ [59] through their work,
and complain about their frequent encounters with this
phenomenon when their own tissue culture work is
described, incorrectly, as genetic artworks [58].
Catts and Zurr have repeatedly made it clear that they
consider themselves to have a different ‘contract’ with
society. They seek to ‘provoke, question and reveal
hypocrisies through different tactics: whether through
aesthetic, absurd or subtle confrontations. Allowing loss
of control or “engineering futility”; making our audi-
ence uneasy is an outcome of our own discomfort’ ([60]:
pp. 6). This is shown in their art through an embrace of
aesthetics of futility and failure. A famous example is
the version of Victimless Leather displayed at New
York’s MoMA in 2008. For this piece they grew
immortalised cells over a miniature jacket-shaped bio-
polymer, as an ironic reflection on future hopes of lab-
grown leather created without killing animals. In previ-
ous exhibitions they had used used a combination of
mouse (connective tissue) and human (bone and skin)
cells, but this time they used mouse embryonic stem
cells, which grew so fast that they clogged up the
automated feeding system—the jacket’s ‘life support’
([61], and email communication from Oron Catts, 7
March 2019). In a publicised act, the curator unplugged
(‘killed’) the cell system before the end of the show, and
the artists often refer back to its monstrous shape. Fig-
ure 1 shows two other failed instances of the artwork:
fungal contamination of the kimono-shaped jacket
grown at the Mori Art Museum in Tokyo in 2010 and
a mysterious jacket ‘melt-down’ at the Casino Luxem-
bourg. These situations are prominently featured in the
artists’ communication of their piece [62, 63], particu-
larly in their references to biological entities’ penchant
to evade the attempted control of life in the lab.
In a recent exhibition called Biomess (2018), the duo
brought together live creatures and specimens from the
Western Australia Museum, that ‘defy human conven-
tions about identity, gender, procreation’ (Zurr, quoted
in [64]). The specimens were elegantly displayed as
‘luxury goods’, in tall, glossy display cases resembling
those one might find in a high-end retail store. The result
was an exhibition that went against the conventions of
both art and science exhibits, but more profoundly,
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challenged conventional ideas about life, organisms,
reproduction and death. From sea sponges that can
reassemble the original organism after having been
disintegrated through a sieve and mixed with other
sponge cells, to bearded dragons with the chromosomes
of one sex but the physical properties of the other, the
exhibition facilitated the realisation that ‘we humans are
basically quite boring in our understanding of life and
what our bodies can do’ (Zurr, quoted in [64]). Howev-
er, humanity’s penchant for affecting change was also
prominently featured. A tragicomic example is that of
the male jewel beetles, which during the 1980s became
attracted to a certain type of brown beer bottle, to the
extent that they ignored the female beetles, resulting in a
reproductive crisis. Finally, a deconstructed incubator
held hybridoma cells, merged from primary and
immortalised mice cells. As an example of lab-grown
organisms that would not have existed without human
manipulation, the hybridomas represent the effect of
science on the world, the creation of new ecologies that
would not have arisen in a ‘natural’ environment.
Tarsh Bates: HumanThrush Entanglements
Tarsh Bates has been working for years with Candida
albicans, or thrush, a common yeast culture that is
symbiotic with human bodies (guts and reproductive
organs) and an opportunistic pathogen. She views Can-
dida as a ‘companion species’—building on Donna
Haraway’s work with dogs, but taking the idea of sig-
nificant others further from our comfortable scales.
Bates has pointed to the warfare metaphors used in the
discussion of pathogenic Candida ([65]: p. 26), includ-
ing terms such as ‘immunological shields’ ([66]: p. 408)
and the notion that ‘Candida evades the host defense
armory’ ([67]: p. 1304).
Her focus, however, is on how these and other mi-
croorganisms are parts of our self—integral components
of our bodies—and she seeks to embrace this through
engaging with the yeast outside of the body. In The
Unsettling Eros of Contact Zones (2015), she baked
bread with Candida, and wished to serve it to the art
gallery audience. However, her university employer at
first refused her suggestion to serve the bread due to
biosafety concerns, although all microorganisms used to
leaven the bread were killed in the baking process. Only
after a meeting to clarify her intentions, a series of food
safety experiments demonstrating that all the microbes
were inactive and a 50-page risk management plan that
included a public anxiety management section did they
consent to have it served (personal communication with
Bates, 27 February 2019).
In Control of Cell Morphology in vivo (2014), Can-
dida was explicitly brought up to our scale through
Fig. 1 Oron Catts and Ionat Zurr, Victimless Leather, 2004-pt. a
‘Melted’ biopolymer mould of jacket, exhibited at Casino Luxem-
bourg. b Protruding fungal growth on jacket at Mori Art Museum,
Tokyo. Photos courtesy of the artists
Fig. 2 Tarsh Bates, Control of Cell Morphology in vivo (2014).
Image credit: Tarsh Bates, 2016. Courtesy of the artist
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images that could be viewed in a zoetrope, a pre-film
animation devise (Fig. 2). The audience, cranking the
handle of the devise, would set the images in motion,
thus interacting with the Candida in an almost intimate
sense, viewing them close-up, but at a safe distance.
Pandilovski [68] and Thacker [69] have argued for the
importance of embodied temporality in the
relationality established by bioart in the presence of
the living other, and Bates’ work exemplifies this: in
engaging with the close-ups of the Candida, we are in
control of the terms of our interactions with the organ-
isms, both being able to slow down or speed up the
images according to our liking, and to feel at once
close and safely remote from the Candida. Bates thus
explicitly creates a context of control for something
that is not, ordinarily, controllable—and this very con-
text brings our ordinary lack of control into sharp
relief. Through facilitating audience encounters with
Candida in various forms, and through poetic writing
about her entanglements with these microbes that os-
cillate between companions and parasites, friends and
foes, she challenges established ways of thinking of




Fig. 3 Ai Hasegawa, I Wanna
Deliver a Dolphin (2013). a Still
from video. b Explanatory chart
of the engineered dolph-human
placenta. Courtesy of the artist
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Ai Hasegawa: I Wanna Deliver a Dolphin
In addition to those working with living organisms and
laboratory methods, a larger group of artists and de-
signers are relating to developments in the life sciences
at the notional level. Ai Hasegawa’s I Wanna Deliver a
Dolphin (2013) exists in the realm of speculative design,
with a proposal of one future application of synthetic
biology. The idea for this piece, first developed in I
Wanna Deliver a Shark (2012), is that we might deal
with human overpopulation and save endangered spe-
cies through humanmothers carrying those species forth
in their womb. This would be done through a
synthetised cross-species placenta, genetically
engineered to not allow antibodies to pass from ‘mother’
to ‘child’. For the second piece in the series, Hasegawa
chose the Maui dolphin, which is critically endangered
(in 2012, there were an estimated 55 left in the world),
with a foetal size close to that of a human foetus.
While the Maui dolphin is no longer commercially
fished for due to its endangered status, it often ends its life
in fishing nets. Hasegawa deliberately chose dolphins and
sharks as types of animals that are popular foods in many
Asian countries and brought near extinction by human
eating habits (personal communication with Hasegawa,
27 February 2019). A challenging part of the vision was
whether you would eat something you had given birth to;
if so, it could be an embodied and engaged way for
humans to grow their own food. Releasing them into
nature would also potentially increase the future food
Fig. 4 Ai Hasegawa, I Wanna
Deliver a Dolphin (2013). a
Dilemma chart. b Sculpture of
dolph-human family. Courtesy of
the artist
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supply. Central to the piece was a video of a woman
‘giving birth’ to a dolphin in a swimming pool (Fig. 3)
and bottle-feeding the new-born calf. A cross-sectionmod-
el of the human belly with dolphin foetus was displayed in
a smooth plaster finish that seemed to emphasise the
hypothetical nature of the scenario. A ‘dilemma chart’
(‘Why don’t I get pregnant with…?’) sought to help
potential parents decide whether to go through with such
a process (Fig. 4a). Further complicating this rich piece
was a story from a future where dolphins were declared
‘non-human persons’ in 2013. In this future, all aquariums
were shut down as cruel and converted to dolph-human
houses, where dolphin babies were born from human
mothers. Avandalised sculpture of a dolph-human ‘family’
was, according to the artist’s text, destroyed by ‘Nature as
Paradise’ activists who sought to reintroduce notions of
species integrity lost in the cross-species breeding practice
(Fig. 4b) [70].
The piece suggests a complex web of possibilities as
to our future interactions with animals, giving rise to
speculative questions such as the following: Would
carrying another animal species within your womb give
rise to similar maternal feelings as carrying a human
foetus? And would this prevent you from later wanting
to eat that particular animal, or other members of its
species? What sort of extra responsibility would this
kind of procreation entail? Is a similar responsibility
required when genetically manipulating life forms in
other, less personal and embodied ways [71]?
Through making us think about our relationship to our
own bodies and those of other living beings, the above
pieces, through quite different means, address life in its
complexity, relationality and potentiality. None of them
use synbio materially, but both Catts and Zurr and Bates
use other forms of biotechnology at the cellular level; they
engage with creatures at the micro-level, in ways that bring
them up to the scale we can experience with the naked eye.
Hasegawa, on the other hand, works in the nominal realm,
asking us to imagine what synbio might lead to if some of
its visions come to fruition. We are living in a culture in
which science and technology have a transformative im-
pact on society that few other fields can match. However,
rich artworks such as these provide an invaluable counter-
point to a dominant mechanistic discourse, encouraging a
more embodied and holistic approach to biotechnology as
embedded in a natural and cultural context [72, 73]. Per-
haps this approach, through showcasing the limits of our
ability to control living beings, can engender further un-
derstanding of other life forms.
Conclusion
Synbio presents more continuity than break with previous
mechanistic approaches to life. Its engineering approach to
understanding and creating life forms can be seen as
symptomatic of tendencies within Western societies to
standardise and abstract in order to understand. In itself
this has, as I have emphasised, been quite helpful in
furthering scientific understanding within biology. How-
ever, an ontological and ethical danger arises from the
conflation of organisms with machines. Although synbio
does not necessarily represent a novel ontological ap-
proach, the predominance of the machine conception of
the organism and the apparent drive to spread the ontolog-
ical assumptions this entails are causes for concern. The
ideas of complete control, reduction and standardisation
are part of what imbues synbio with its power [14]. Al-
though this way of perceiving life can lead to important
biotechnological innovations, the dominance of the ma-
chine conception can provide a hindrance both to further
scientific understanding and to relational ways of thinking
about living organisms.
I have argued that artworks such as those by Catts and
Zurr, Bates and Hasegawa have the capacity to shift our
perceptions of the living things around us, through em-
bracing and appreciating the messiness and complexity of
even minute forms of life, bringing them up to our level of
perception and embedding them in cultural imaginations
of our present and future. They can thus serve as counter-
points in a technoscientific discussion that is largely fo-
cused on utility, application and risk. Rather than
explaining complex organisms by reference to their parts,
these works show us a way of thinking about organisms in
their environment that, although perhaps not feasible as a
scientific approach, at the societal level can serve to bal-
ance out the ontology of controllable life.
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